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Commercial and Residential Evictions in California in the time of COVID-19 (Part 2 of 3) Updated as of: August 13, 2020

April 10, 2020/in All Blog Posts, Corporate Litigation/by Ajay Gupta

Part 1 of this three-part article, which addresses Governor Newsom’s statewide eviction moratorium in California, can be found here. Part two covers San Diego’s actions in the pandemic.

City of San Diego Eviction Moratorium

On March 25, 2020, the City of San Diego[1] adopted its own temporary eviction ban when the San Diego City Council unanimously adopted Ordinance No. O-21177.  The Ordinance not only halted both residential and commercial evictions through May 31, 2020, but also provided affected tenants with approximately six months to repay any unpaid rent as a result of the Coronavirus pandemic.

Since passage of the Ordinance, the San Diego City Council has since extended the eviction protections twice—first to June 30, 2020, and then again to September 30, 2020.

Like the California Order, tenants must meet specific benchmarks in order to receive the protections of the City’s Ordinance.  If a commercial or residential tenant does not meet these specific benchmarks, the tenant will not be protected under the City of San Diego Ordinance and a landlord will be permitted to immediately pursue any applicable rent enforcement or eviction actions, to the extent permitted by law.  Tenants must satisfy all of the following criteria:

  1. Unable to timely pay rent due on or after March 12, 2020;
  2. Tenant’s inability to pay rent is due to financial impacts related to COVID-19;
    • “Financial impacts” are specifically defined as: a substantial decrease in household income for a residential tenant, or in business income for a commercial tenant, due to business closure, loss of compensable hours of work or wages, layoffs, or substantial out-of-pocket medical expenses.
    • A financial impact is “related to COVID-19” if: it is caused by the COVID-19 pandemic or any governmental response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including complying with any public health orders or recommended guidance related to COVID-19 from local, state, or federal governmental authorities.”
  3. On or before rent due date, tenant must provide written notice to the landlord of inability to pay (e-mail or texts message is sufficient); and
    • A sample letter that tenants can use to provide notice can be found at the San Diego Housing Commission’s website.
  4. Within one week of giving landlord notice of inability to pay, the tenant must provide landlord with documents or objectively verifiable information that the tenant is unable to pay rent because of the financial effects of COVID-19
    • Examples of documentation: note or letter from employer regarding tenant’s loss or substantial reduction in employment; payroll records showing substantial loss of income due to COVID-19; bank statements that illustrate a drop in income; or other documentation that proves that tenant has not been generating the same level of income due to COVID-19.

An obvious, and significant, difference in the City of San Diego’s Ordinance relative to both Orders previously issued by Governor Newsom is the application to commercial tenants, in addition to residential tenants.  This paves the way for struggling San Diego businesses to get a much-needed reprieve from paying rent after their income stream has been drastically reduced, or disappeared, effectively overnight.  

Additionally, the City’s Ordinance also prohibits landlords from “taking any action to evict a tenant,” which is explicitly defined to include serving notices (e.g. serve 3-Day Notices To Pay or Quit), as well as charging late fees.  The prohibition against serving notices is a notable difference from the statewide eviction moratorium in that service of a notice to pay rent or quit, which would very likely expire and terminate tenancies, would effectively hand tenants a ticking eviction timebomb set to go off once the Ordinance was no longer in effect.  

An interesting wrinkle in the ordinance is with respect to “no-fault” evictions—evictions not based on the tenant’s actions, such as the landlord removing the property from the rental market or performing renovations.  If a tenant falls within the scope of San Diego’s Ordinance, as specified above, landlords are also prohibited from pursuing a “no-fault eviction.”  This would appear to be an effort to avoid landlords that my try and do and end-around the Ordinance by disguising non-payment of rent (at-fault) evictions as no-fault evictions.

Lastly, it is important to note that the City’s Ordinance does not relieve the tenant of liability for unpaid rent after expiration of the provisions this Ordinance (currently September 30, 2020).  Rather, the obligation to pay rent is simply deferred for up to six months, unless the tenant moves out sooner, in which case all unpaid rent becomes due upon move out.  If the rent balance remains unpaid after six months, the landlord may pursue collection and eviction remedies immediately.

In addition to the relief efforts at the state and local level to avoid to evictions, the Judicial Council of California has also endeavored to cut to the chase and suspend all evictions across the State of California for the foreseeable future, but that may be coming to and end very soon—all of which is discussed in Part 3 of this article here along with next steps going forward. 

[1] Imperial Beach, Chula Vista, San Marcos and Oceanside are also taking similar steps to shield renters from eviction.

The materials available at this web site are for informational purposes only and not for the purpose of providing legal advice. You should contact your attorney to obtain advice with respect to any particular issue or problem. Use of and access to this web site or any of the e-mail links contained within the site do not create an attorney-client relationship. The opinions expressed at or through this site are the opinions of the individual author and may not reflect the opinions of the firm or any individual attorney.  

https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GA-Logo-Header-Blue-300x119.png 0 0 Ajay Gupta https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GA-Logo-Header-Blue-300x119.png Ajay Gupta2020-04-10 19:43:002026-04-08 15:43:26Commercial and Residential Evictions in California in the time of COVID-19 (Part 2 of 3) Updated as of: August 13, 2020

Commercial and Residential Evictions in California in the time of COVID-19 (Part 3 of 3) Updated as of: August 13, 2020

April 10, 2020/in All Blog Posts, Corporate Litigation/by Ajay Gupta

Part 1 and Part 2 of this three-part article, which addresses Governor Newsom’s statewide California eviction moratorium and the City of San Diego, can be found here and here.

The Judicial Council of California’s Emergency Rule 1

On April 6, 2020, the Judicial Council of California adopted 11 categories of COVID-19 emergency rules to assist California courts in a variety of respects, one of which is evictions.  Pursuant to Emergency Rule 1, effective immediately, essentially all evictions and unlawful detainers are suspended.  The rule prohibits any California Court from issuing a summons on any unlawful detainer complaint, as well as entering the default of any tenant in any unlawful detainer action.  There is a narrow exception for actions necessary to “protect public health and safety;” however, this phrase is undefined.  As originally drafted, this Rule was set to remain in place until 90 days after Governor Newsom lifts the California State of Emergency declaration. 

As time ticked by and the pandemic worsened across California, it became quite clear that the California State of Emergency was not going to be lifted any time soon.  As a result, the statewide ban on evictions, pursuant to Emergency Rule 1, was essentially set to be in place indefinitely. Realizing this and reiterating the intent of Emergency Rule 1 to only be temporary, the Judicial Council of California took action to amend Emergency Rule 1.

On August 13, 2020, the Judicial Council voted 19-1 to amend Emergency Rule 1 to end California’s statewide eviction freeze. Pursuant to the Judicial Council’s amendment, the statewide eviction freeze will be lifted as of September 1, 2020.  In voting to amend the eviction ban, California Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye stated, “The duty of the judicial branch is to resolve disputes under the law and not to legislate. I urge our sister branches to act expeditiously to resolve this looming crisis.”

The Judicial Council’s eviction suspension was extraordinarily broad in that it did not limit itself to situations in which commercial or residential tenants are grappling with financial difficulties caused by COVID-19, and, instead, served as a blanket suspension on evictions. For over five months, the Emergency Rule has prevented landlords from taking any legal action against any tenant, regardless of whether the tenant has been affected by COVID-19.  Now, with the passage of the Judicial Council’s Amendment to lift the statewide eviction freeze, California State Courts can now resume all unlawful detainer proceedings that came to a sudden halt in April of 2020 and begin processing all unlawful detainer complaints filed during the eviction freeze.

Similar to Governor Newsom’s eviction Order, the Judicial Council’s rule did not alleviate the root problem of tenants being unable to pay rent.  As noted by the California Chief Justice, the legislature—not the judiciary—have the proper tools to attempt to solve the inevitable eviction crisis, and it will up to the California legislative bodies to craft a solution to afford relief to residential tenants.  One such measure that the State Legislature is considering is AB 1436, which strikes a balance of protecting financially impacted tenants from eviction while also preserving landlords’ rights.

AB 1436 prohibits landlords from evicting tenants that cannot pay rent due to the economic effects of COVID-19. However, the proposed law permits landlords to evict a tenant that is not financially affected by COVID-19 and fails to pay rent, or a tenant that occupies the property unlawfully.  In its current form, AB 1436 satisfies landlords’ interests and concerns and protects tenants that have felt the financial impacts of COVID-19. AB 1436 does not apply to commercial tenancies.   

President Donald Trump’s Executive Order to Ban All Evictions

On August 8, 2020, President Donald Trump signed four separate executive orders, one of which was meant to protect all U.S. renters from eviction (the “Order”). However, the Order does little to achieve its overall purpose as it does not restrict any landlord, commercial or residential, from evicting a tenant.

The Order directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Director of the CDC to evaluate whether halting evictions is “reasonably necessary to prevent the further spread of COVID-19.” The Order also instructs the Secretaries of the Treasury and Housing and Urban Development departments to identify all federal funds that can be used to provide temporary financial assistance to renters that are struggling to pay rent.  The Secretaries of Treasury and Housing and Urban Development are further required to “promote the ability of renters and homeowners to avoid eviction.”

The Order does little to effectuate an instant protection to millions of Americans—and Californians—that are struggling to pay rent. Rather, the Order requires that other federal agencies investigate the problem and determine if it necessary to halt evictions and provide financial relief to renters.  Looking ahead, all renters across the U.S., including California renters, must look to their state legislatures and local municipalities for assistance.

Conclusion & Recommendations

Commercial and residential landlords and tenants are facing an incredibly unique and unparalleled set of circumstances.  The temporary eviction moratoriums at both the state and local levels have been enacted to try and combat not only the financial and economic stresses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, but also the consequences of such stresses, such as losing one’s home or possession of a business.  It is important to be cognizant of the fact that there are sure to be situations and instances that remain unaddressed, subject to dispute or simply fall within the inevitable grey areas.  Additionally, the landscape will continue to shift and landlords and tenants should continue to look for the most recent updates.   

With that in mind, landlords and tenants should try to be patient with each other and remain organized.  Document as much of the interactions with your tenant or landlord as you can, and preserve all letters, notices, correspondence (e-mails and text messages included) exchanged with your landlord or tenant.  Additionally, both landlords and tenants should understand that tenants will still be responsible for the rent that they are unable to pay on time. The eviction moratoriums do not forgive tenant’s missed rent payment.  Finally, the requirements in the Orders and Ordinance speaking to notice and documentation are the minimum requirements.  There is nothing from preventing a landlord or a tenant from engaging further with one another to try and come to mutual understandings, payment plans, lease addendums or the like and such options should almost always be considered. 

Should you have questions or concerns about your rights or obligations, whether from a landlord or tenant’s perspective, an experienced real estate attorney can help you navigate these issues and the uncertainty that comes along with them.

The materials available at this web site are for informational purposes only and not for the purpose of providing legal advice. You should contact your attorney to obtain advice with respect to any particular issue or problem. Use of and access to this web site or any of the e-mail links contained within the site do not create an attorney-client relationship. The opinions expressed at or through this site are the opinions of the individual author and may not reflect the opinions of the firm or any individual attorney.  

https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GA-Logo-Header-Blue-300x119.png 0 0 Ajay Gupta https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GA-Logo-Header-Blue-300x119.png Ajay Gupta2020-04-10 19:37:002026-04-08 15:43:35Commercial and Residential Evictions in California in the time of COVID-19 (Part 3 of 3) Updated as of: August 13, 2020

Webinar: COVID-19 – Impact and Options for SoCal Businesses

April 9, 2020/in All Blog Posts, Bankruptcy/by Ajay Gupta

As the COVID-19 pandemic has surged upwards, our practice has seen a dramatic uptick in the number of calls we’ve been receiving from business owners, including landlords, tenants and lenders, who are all grappling with issues never before seen and seeking answers to questions they have never faced before. In an effort to educate the community and businesses about what we’re seeing in San Diego, we put together a panel on Covid-19 impact and options for a Webinar. 

The Webinar was held April 1st, 2020 and featured the following panelists:

Ajay Gupta, Founder of Gupta Evans and Associates.
Attorney Ajay Gupta is a certified bankruptcy specialist and has been working on real estate and bankruptcy matter since 2005. He represents both debtors and creditors in state and federal bankruptcy court on a host of matters from secured transactions, to landlord-tenant disputes, to complex bankruptcy matters.
Sam Brotman, Founder of Brotman Law.
Attorney Sam Brotman’spractice primarily centers on all aspects of tax litigation and criminal/civil tax controversies in front of the Internal Revenue Service, Franchise Tax Board, Employment Development Department, California Department of Tax and Fee Administration, and various other state/local tax agencies.
Randy Newman, Founder Total Lender Solutions
Attorney Randy Newman is the founder of Total Lender Solutions which operates as the foreclosure trustee for numerous lenders across the country. Randy works primarily as an agent for lenders where there is a default on a loan and foreclosure is imminent
Jon Fleming, Receiver at Legacy Receivers.
Jon Fleming’spractice focuses primarily on receiverships and asset management. As an asset manager, Jon manages a number of housing units and is on the front line of many of the new eviction rules and issues. As a receiver, Jon is frequently called in to manage secured assets where there has been a default by a secured borrower.
Sean O'Neill advisor at US Bank.
Sean O’Neill
Vice President | Relationship Manager
Emerging Business Group | U.S. Bank Business Banking
sean.oneill@usbank.com

Please feel free to reach out to any of us with your questions or concerns. I’d again like to thank the panelists for sharing their knowledge and making this Webinar a success.

https://www.youtube.com/embed/krE6WerOz60
https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GA-Logo-Header-Blue-300x119.png 0 0 Ajay Gupta https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GA-Logo-Header-Blue-300x119.png Ajay Gupta2020-04-09 21:39:002026-04-08 15:43:55Webinar: COVID-19 – Impact and Options for SoCal Businesses

Squatter’s Rights, Prescriptive Easements, and Adverse Possession

April 8, 2020/in All Blog Posts, Corporate Litigation, Real Estate/by Ajay Gupta

Though a property owner may prefer not to consider it, there are rights which an individual is entitled after using a property for a particular period of time despite the fact that they do not own said property. Legally, when an individual uses a property without the permission of the owner it is known as adverse possession. California has a variety of protections for both property owners and squatters that ensure that these circumstances can be litigated fairly and effectively.

For those engaged in adverse possession the law is highly specific. Depending on the type of property and the manner of its use, the failure of a property owner to take action against a squatter can eventually lead to the latter claiming legal ownership of the property. Though the requirements vary widely, they generally include paying property taxes continuously for 5 years.

Property owners have few means of recourse other than litigation, as the courts must establish conclusively that the squatter has no authentic claim to the property before eviction can be pursued. Such claims commonly include tenant’s rights, or a situation where the claimant can prove that they provided monetary compensation, goods or services to the property owner in exchange for use of the property. Even an implied oral or written contract with the owner could be valid. If this can be established any attempt at eviction would have to proceed in accordance with local landlord-tenant law.

Prescriptive easement is a commonly encountered relative of adverse possession. Generally it entails intermittent use of a section of a property for a particular purpose without the consent of the owner, such as an unpaved driveway to one’s property that runs across another property for some distance. Like adverse possession, the key to any claim is continuous unchecked use for a period of time, otherwise it is simply trespassing. However, the major difference is that the claimant does not have to pay property taxes and other parts of the property can be used and resided upon by the owner during the claimed period of continuity.

https://www.youtube.com/embed/lGjmvrEL-9g
https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/felix-ngo-wOYNZDt375Q-unsplash-scaled.jpg 1707 2560 Ajay Gupta https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GA-Logo-Header-Blue-300x119.png Ajay Gupta2020-04-08 21:45:002026-04-08 15:45:24Squatter’s Rights, Prescriptive Easements, and Adverse Possession

Small Businesses and Covid-19 on March 30, 2020

April 1, 2020/in All Blog Posts, Bankruptcy/by Ajay Gupta

Two weeks ago today, I was standing in front of Judge Styn in San Diego Superior Court expecting to get a one-week bench trial underway.  This was after we had waived our jury the prior Friday when San Diego had suspended jury trials due to the Coronavirus.  Judge Styn is 79 years old and the San Diego Courts were shut down the following day.  For most of us, we’ve only been living with the impact of this virus for just two weeks, but for small businesses, so much has changed over those two weeks.  

This article attempts to provide some resources for small businesses and individuals as we all navigate this global health crisis.  Things are changing rapidly, but this article is current as of today and has a lot of useful information for small businesses. 

We are in the middle of what is going to be a very difficult time for small businesses.  With a focus on bankruptcy and real estate, our practice has been busy with calls from business owners (landlords, tenants, lenders) who are all grappling with issues never before seen and seeking answers to questions they have never faced before. On the Debtor side, the early calls focus on companies that were mostly on very unstable ground before they got to us.  COVID-19 is the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back for these companies.  For creditors and landlords, the preliminary calls have not yet been defaults, but, rather, game plans for work arounds and updates for new laws concerning evictions and foreclosures. 

The biggest impact of the Coronavirus is to retail businesses and restaurants.  At a fundamental level, 90% of retailers are shut down completely and fast food is the only restaurant that can even operate in this environment.  Retailers employ 15.6 million people in this country while and another 16 million are in retail.  Together, they make up approximately 20% of the workforce of this country.  The vast majority of those people are currently unemployed and there are many looming questions as to whether those businesses are going to be able to survive the downturn. 

It goes without saying that we are in the early stages and any fallout will largely depend on how long this process takes.  California’s “Stay At Home” order issued by Governor Newsom was issued on March 19, 2020 and, as of the date of this writing, all signs suggest that it will be in place through the end of April, at least; but there is a huge difference between six weeks and 12 weeks in terms of the economics of this situation and the impact it will have on businesses and business owners alike.  

As the crisis further develops, new orders, mandates and regulations will likely be issued, and we will try and update you with these as they are released.  The hope for businesses is that California can strive to stay ahead of the fallout and provide as much as clarity on the situation, for better or worse, as the matter unfolds.

The Courts and the Stay at Home Order:  

The San Diego Superior Court closed on March 17th and will continue to be closed through April 3rd.  There will be no jury trials until at least May 22nd and all existing jury trial dates have been continued 60 days.  While certain emergency services are available, it is widely expected that the April 3rd date will be extended for at least another two weeks as San Diego is entering into an acceleration phase for the disease.  This is especially likely as the federal government has now advised that the current social distancing guidelines remain in place through April 30, 2020.

What this means is that the Courts are essentially inaccessible through most of April.  What is already an overburdened system will be backlogged by another 2 months of cases making access to the judicial system that much more difficult and expensive.  

Federal Courts have not yet suspended operations, at least not in the 9th circuit.  Some oral arguments have been postponed, but the Bankruptcy Court has issued an order allowing for telephonic appearances for all oral arguments and a number of orders to allow filings to continue.  In large part because the federal system has transitioned to an electronic system over two decades ago, they appear to have been well positioned to allow for appropriate social distancing without a complete cessation of activity.  

Mortgages and Covid-19:

With 2008 in very recent memory, the federal government and banks are gearing up for a number of missed payments, whether its commercial or residential.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have announced programs for loan forbearance for both residential and commercial mortgages for up to 12 months.  One of the challenges from a borrower’s perspective is determining whether your loan is owned by one these two juggernauts, as the servicing company will differ from the entity listed on the deed of trust that will likely differ from the entity who owns your loan.  

To put things into perspective, the total amount of mortgage debt is estimated at $15.8 Trillion and Fannie and Freddie are estimated to have guaranteed or own somewhere around $4.4 Trillion (See also Bloomberg).  The important thing is that you may be one of the 28 Million loans that may be owned by Fannie or Freddie that may make you eligible for relief.  Below are some links that will help you find out if you have a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac Loan.

  • https://www.knowyouroptions.com/loanlookup
  • https://ww3.freddiemac.com/loanlookup/

California has also teamed up with the largest banks and about 200 local lenders to provide some relief.  Essentially, if your lender is one of the institutions identified at the link below, the lender will grant a 90-day moratorium on payments for COVID-19 related missed payments. Additionally, any missed payments resulting from COVID-19 will not affect your credit ratings.  There shall also be a 60-day moratorium from these institutions on foreclosures.  A current list of participating lenders and servicing agents is below.

  • https://dbo.ca.gov/covid19-updates-fi/

Evictions and Covid-19

There are essentially two main things that will impact evictions in California in the short run.   First, there is the issue of whether the Court will actually be open.  For now, Courts are closed until April 3rd and I’m fully expecting them to remain closed through April 17th.  

More importantly, on March 27th, the state of California has imposed a moratorium on evictions caused by Covid-19 hardships.  That moratorium will be in effect until May 31st.  In short, if a tenant has documentation demonstrating loss of employment or reduction in income due to the COVID-19 pandemic, then the tenant cannot be evicted for nonpayment of rent and the tenant should notify the landlord immediately.  If a tenant falls within this moratorium, the tenant will have an additional six months to pay the unpaid rent.  However, it is important to highlight that this is NOT a moratorium on a tenant’s obligation to pay rent if they are otherwise unaffected by COVID-19. 

This is obviously a developing story and we’ll update you as we learn more. Broadly speaking, any real hardship in this environment can at least in some part be attributed to COVID-19 and, if a tenant’s employment or income has been lost from the hardship and can be documented, then the tenant should be protected under the moratorium.

Summary of the $350 Billion stimulus package:

On Friday, the federal government passed a $2 Trillion stimulus bill.  While large chunks are dedicated to beefing up COVID-19 responses ($275 Billion), maintaining large businesses ($500 Billion), and direct injections to Americans in need ($560 Billion) (See https://howmuch.net/articles/breakdown-coronavirus-2t-economic-stimulus), $350 Billion has been earmarked for loans to small businesses.  

That’s a lot of loans.  The SBA estimates that there are 30 million small businesses in the US, which means this stimulus provides for an average of more than $10,000 per business in the US.  The challenge will clearly be the administration of these loans.  If you’re a small business and your vision for the next 3 – 6 months is cloudy, you need to start the application process right away.  The SBA is notoriously slow at processing applications, and if you wait, you will miss the window.

The details as we understand them are as follows:

  • stablishes and provides funding for forgivable bridge loans;
  • loans will cover from February 15, 2020 and end June 30, 2020;
  • businesses, nonprofits, self-employed individuals, sole proprietorships, and independent contractors with less than 500 employees are eligible;
  • loans are capped at the lesser of $10 million or 2.5 times the total of the applicant’s average monthly payments for payroll costs for 1-year prior to obtaining the loan;
  • proceeds may be used for payroll costs, group health care benefits, employee salaries, commissions, compensation, interest on mortgage obligations, rent, utilities, and interest on debt obligations (approved expenses) incurred before the covered period;
  • no personal guarantees or collateral are required for the loans;
  • the loans are non-recourse so long as the proceeds are used for an approved purpose;
  • any balance remaining on the loan after forgiveness shall be for a 10-year term at an interest rate not greater than 4%;
  • loans may be eligible for forgiveness of indebtedness in an amount equal to the sum of approved expenses incurred during the 8-week period after loan origination;
  • forgiven loan amount may be reduced based upon the number of employees and adjustments in reduced salaries and wages;
  • canceled indebtedness is excluded from gross income;
  • provides additional funding for grants and technical assistance;
  • establishes limits on requirements for employers to provide paid leave; and
  • strengthens unemployment insurance, which could potentially add $600 per week for up to four months on top of what a state would give beneficiaries.

(From https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e7a31eb2-9263-48ff-94d9-0947a0af8073)

The loans themselves are broken down into two major types, the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL).  Only the PPP is eligible for loan forgiveness based on maintaining a certain number of employees.  The PPP must be applied for through your local bank, while the EIDL must be applied for directly through the SBA.

Matt Garrett, the CEO of TGG Accounting, just did a fantastic webinar on the stimulus package this morning.  As of this email, it’s not up on TGG’s website, but I’m hopeful that it will be soon.  For those looking to take advantage of the stimulus package for small businesses, this video is an excellent resource.  Matt and his team are well ahead of the curve on the stimulus package and we all need to take advantage of their expertise as TGG has been extraordinarily generous in compiling, organizing and sharing their research.  See:  https://tgg-accounting.com/blog/

Other Bankruptcy News:  Chapter 5 Bankruptcy

On February 19th, and, remarkably, completely unrelated to the Coronavirus, the federal government passed a large amendment to the bankruptcy laws that will make bankruptcy more accessible to small businesses.  Welcome, the Chapter 5 bankruptcy.  For practitioners, it is essentially a hybrid between a Chapter 11 and a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and businesses with less than $2.7 Million in secured debt are eligible to file.  

Up until this point, filing a bankruptcy for a small business required a certain level of overhead that made it extraordinarily cost prohibitive for small businesses.  It is extremely difficult to rationalize adding significant legal expense to an already overburdened business in order to justify filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy and, as a result, it really remained only a nuclear bomb option for most small business debtors.  

The new, Chapter 5 does away with much of the overhead associated with a Chapter 11 including the costs associated with maintaining a creditor’s committee and producing a disclosure statement.  More importantly, the Chapter 5 allows you to “impair” creditors without a vote of those creditors so long as the distribution to them is “feasible”, does not “unfairly discriminate”, and is “fair and equitable”.  Effectively, the Chapter 5 allows for a discharge over the course of time, which, while possible in a Chapter 11, was extremely difficult.

The hardest hit small businesses are retailers and restaurants.  The stay at home orders have effectively shut down most of these businesses.  While many costs in these types of operations are scalable, the two that are not are going to be rent and debt service.

Rent is a particular problem for restaurants and retailers.  Unlike a law firm, who we are learning can function from home or pretty much anywhere, a restaurant or retailer is intimately tied to its location.  What is more difficult is that, under California law, a commercial lease terminates likely at the end of a validly issued notice to pay or quit, not a judgement for possession.  (See In re Windmill Farms.)  What that means is that even in bankruptcy, a lease cannot be reinstated once the notice to pay or quit has expired.

Because of the nature of retail and restaurants and how COVID-19 has impacted this particular group of businesses and the “short fuse” associated with lease terminations, it is likely that we are going to see more Chapter 5 filings over the coming 12 months.

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Does The Coronavirus Pandemic Qualify As a Force Majeure Event?

March 31, 2020/in All Blog Posts, Bankruptcy/by Dylan Contreras

In the wake of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, state and local governments throughout the U.S. have ordered restaurants, bars, and shopping centers to shut down, while businesses that sell essential products can remain open. Due to the pandemic, small and large companies are forced to close their doors and find clever ways to remain competitive in a world where “dining in” is no longer an option. 

As companies prepare for the unknown, they should also ask how this turbulent time will affect their contracts, and more importantly, whether they are still required to perform their contractual obligations during this global health crisis. This article will provide a thorough analysis of the force majeure defense that may excuse a party from performing his or her otherwise required contractual duties.

What is Force Majeure?

Force majeure—which means “superior force” en français—excuses a party’s nonperformance of a given contractual duty when an unanticipated event, such as a pandemic or epidemic, occurs. The force majeure defense is available by statute and the force majeure clause, which is included in many contracts. 

Force Majeure By Statute

Section 1511 of the Cal. Civ. Code provides that a party is excused from a contractual obligation when performance is prevented or delayed by (1) operation of law or (2) an irresistible or superhuman cause. 

Operation of Law, Cal. Civ. Code 1511 (1)

The broad language of section 1511 (1) invites the question of whether Governor Newsom’s Stay at Home Order renders performance of a contractual obligation illegal, impracticable, or frustrates the underlying purpose for why both parties entered into the contract.  California courts have consistently reinforced the broad language of section 1511. 

For instance, in Indus. Dev. & Land Co. v. Goldschmidt, 56 Cal. App. 507 (1922), the plaintiff entered into a commercial lease agreement that restricted his use of the property to the operation of a liquor business. After Congress passed the Prohibition Amendment, the plaintiff argued that he was excused from paying any further rents because the operation of his business became illegal. The court sided with the plaintiff, finding that the lease agreement became inoperative after the passage of the 18th Amendment, which made performance of his contractual duty illegal. Id at 509.

Likewise, in Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App. 2d 430 (1942), the court held that a Colombian buyer was not liable for breach of contract because the Colombian government refused to issue the buyer a legal permit to accept a shipment. The court reasoned that had the buyer accepted the goods he would have committed an unlawful act, which justified his nonperformance. Id. at 432.

However, just because an event may fall within the purview of section 1511(1), it does not mean that a party is automatically excused from satisfying their contractual obligations.  There are limits to this rule, and each potential application of section 1511 will require a fact-intensive inquiry of the  circumstances.  

In Dwight v. Callaghan, 53 Cal. App. 132 (1921), for instance, the defendant claimed he could not satisfy his contractual duties because the U.S. government purchased a large quantity of the same materials the defendant needed to satisfy his contractual obligations. The court found that the plaintiff had acquired the same materials from other suppliers such that the government’s interference with defendant’s performance did not render performance impossible; but, instead, just more expensive than the defendant had initially anticipated. Id. at 137.  This case, and the many that came after it, showcases how the concept of force majeure can be misused by parties and how what appears “impossible” to one person is, in reality, just merely more difficult.  In such circumstances, a Court will not permit a party to avoid liability simply because performance is more costly or burdensome than originally anticipated. See Habitat Tr. for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga, 175 Cal. App. 4th 1306, 1336 (2009).

Turning to the present and the Coronavirus pandemic, it is hard to say how broadly (or narrowly) section 1511 (1) could arguably be applied to excuse performance of contracting parties.  On one hand, whether performance of a given contractual duty will result in a violation of Governor Newsom’s Stay at Home Order thereby making it illegal is unclear.  Police have not begun enforcing the order, by either ordering people to return home or issuing citations (at least at the time of this article).  However, government actions are evolving, and it is reasonable to predict that Governor Newsom may order law enforcement officials to enforce the executive order by way of citations or other means.  On the other hand, by issuing an order that requires individuals to remain at home and “shelter in place,” and that requires months’ long closures of businesses, Governor Newsom’s Order almost certainly prevents, or at the very least delays, performance of certain categories of contractual obligations. If that is the case, then a vast amount of contractual duties will likely be excused.

Irresistible or Superhuman Causes, Cal. Civ. Code 1511 (2)

“Acts of God” encompass the latter section of 1511(2), and excuse a party’s nonperformance if a natural event, like a pandemic, earthquake, or flood occurs that renders performance impossible. In most instances, the court’s ruling will often turn on whether the natural event was unanticipated by the parties at the time of contracting. See Ryan v. Rogers, 96 Cal. 349 (1892). 

For example, in Ryan v. Rogers, 96 Cal. 349 (1892), the defendant pleaded that he was unable to complete his deliveries because heavy rainfall had flooded his usual delivery route. The court found that the defendant knew—before signing the contract—that rainstorms were a common occurrence during that time of year, and defendant’s usual delivery route was often flooded after a heavy rainstorm.  Based on these findings, the court concluded that the flood was not unforeseeable, but expected at some point during the life of the contract and held the defendant liable for breach of contract.  Id. at 353.  

In comparison, the court in Ontario Deciduous Fruit-Growers’ Ass’n v. Cutting Fruit-Packing Co., 134 Cal. 21 (1901) held that a farmer was excused from furnishing specific varieties of fruit because the farmer’s orchards were “so far affected by an extraordinary drought.” Id. at 25. The court concluded that the farmer “[cannot] be made to perform impossibilities” in light of extreme weather conditions that were not contemplated by the parties when they signed the contract. Id. 

Both cases teach us that courts are not willing to excuse a party’s nonperformance just because a natural event, like severe weather, interferes with the party’s performance. The court’s critical inquiry is whether the natural event was foreseeable by the parties when they executed the contract.  If an impediment to a party’s performance is anticipated or foreseeable at the time of contracting, courts take the position that the party concerned about such impediment should draft contract terms to account for such risk or concern.

In closing, the Coronavirus pandemic may on its surface qualify as an “Act of God.”  However, different from the courts’ usual probe, the main question here will be whether the Coronavirus qualifies as a “natural event” for purposes of section 1511 (2).  Some argue that the Coronavirus outbreak is a natural event because we did not intentionally create the virus; rather, it is a natural product of our interactions and actions.  Even if the Coronavirus does not meet the definition of “natural event,” the resulting effects of the pandemic, such as Governor Newsom’s order touched on above, would likely trigger the application of section 1511 to a variety of otherwise required contractual obligations.  Courts throughout California will be forced to answer these questions with no precedent to rely on, as our country has not been confronted with a global health crisis, like this one, before.

Force Majeure By Contract

Before resorting to section 1511, nonperforming parties should first turn to their contract to determine whether a force majeure clause is included in their contract.  Force majeure clauses are worded differently from contract to contract; but, generally, a force majeure clause will excuse a party’s nonperformance (or delay performance) of a given contractual duty when an unanticipated event specified in the clause occurs, rendering performance temporarily impossible. 

The occurrence of an event specified in the force majeure clause does not automatically excuse a party from fulfilling their contractual commitments. Instead, the nonperforming party claiming nonperformance was justified due to an unforeseen event must satisfy two requirements.

The first requirement is the event that caused the party’s nonperformance must have been unforeseeable at the time the parties signed the contract. This requirement is akin to the analysis above regarding section 1511(2) and the holding in Ryan v. Rogers, 96 Cal. 349 (1892).

Second, performance must have been “impracticable” or “impossible” when performance was due, which largely mirrors the analysis of section 1511(1). Specific to force majeure provisions included in a contract, the nonperforming party must demonstrate that performance would cause them to suffer “an extreme loss, expense, difficulty, or injury.” Butler v. Nepple, 54 Cal. 2d 589, 599 (1960). However, a party cannot avoid liability merely because performance was more costly or burdensome than originally anticipated. Id.

In Butler v. Nepple, Nepple breached the contract because the steelworkers’ union went on strike, and he could not obtain the steel needed to satisfy his contractual commitments.  Critical to Nepple’s argument was that the force majeure clause specified that if the steelworkers’ union went on strike, his performance was excused.  Despite the clear language of the force majeure provision, the California Supreme Court disagreed. The court held that Nepple failed to show the other steel manufacturers’ prices were “extreme and unreasonable” based on what he usually paid.  The court concluded that had Nepple satisfied his contractual obligations and obtained the requisite steel, Nepple would have only incurred a “mere increase in expense,” which does not justify a party’s nonperformance of a given contractual duty. Id. 

Force majeure clauses are often overlooked during contract negotiations and are not given the attention they deserve.  As such, businesses and people alike may find that their contracts contain boilerplate force majeure clauses that do not specifically address the Coronavirus pandemic. Whether a force majeure clause covers the current Coronavirus pandemic will not only depend on the exact language of the provision itself (e.g. acts of god, “catch-all” provisions), but also the specific circumstances of the case and to what extent the unforeseen event impacted a party’s performance—was it made impractical, or just more difficult? 

It must be clarified that the defenses described, including the ones by statute, will likely only excuse a party’s performance temporarily.  A party must resume satisfying its contractual obligations if and when it is no longer impossible to do so.  

Protecting Your Legal Interests Right Now

The Coronavirus pandemic has made us question whether we can perform our contractual obligations, whether the other party has the means to perform, and what measures we should take to protect our interests.  Below are some tips that address each of these questions:

Have You Determined That You Cannot Perform Your Contractual Duties?

  • Explore and evaluate other options to complete performance—that is, like Nepple, seek out alternative suppliers, vendors, etc., and determine the added expense of using such alternative options;
  • Communicate your position with the other contracting parties early to make each party aware of the circumstances, and to see whether you can work together to facilitate a resolution. 

Are You Owed Performance?

  • Contact the performing party to ensure that they can or intend to satisfy their contractual obligations during the pandemic. 
  • If the performing party cannot uphold their contractual commitments, then explore other options with the nonperforming party to find a solution, if possible. Courts frown upon non-breaching parties that refuse to work with the nonperforming party during a national crisis. 

Are You Drafting A Contract?

  • Include a force majeure clause that specifies if the Coronavirus makes performance illegal or impossible, then the party is excused from performing its contractual obligations. 
  • Force majeure clauses can also include any events that the parties believe will safeguard their interests. Do not be afraid to add any other language such as national emergency, terrorist attacks, riots, civil unrest, executive orders, etc.

Conclusion

Overall, the discharge of a given contractual duty is a fact-intensive inquiry that is determined on a case-by-case basis.  If you are unsure whether your performance is excused or whether you can hold a party in breach of a contract for failing to perform, then speak to a California attorney for  guidance. 

The materials available at this web site are for informational purposes only and not for the purpose of providing legal advice. You should contact your attorney to obtain advice with respect to any particular issue or problem. Use of and access to this web site or any of the e-mail links contained within the site do not create an attorney-client relationship. The opinions expressed at or through this site are the opinions of the individual author and may not reflect the opinions of the firm or any individual attorney.

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The CBD FAQ

December 8, 2019/in All Blog Posts, Cannabis, Corporate Litigation/by Jake Ayres

CBD, short for cannabidiol, is the wildly popular compound that has found its way into food, drinks, supplements, cosmetics, and even dog treats.  CBD is a non-psychoactive instance of the 113 known cannabinoids, organic compounds unique to cannabis.  Celebrity athletes have gotten into the game as well, with ex-Patriots tight end and lovable goofball Rob Gronkowski partnering with CBD Medic and North Shore cult hero professional surfer Jamie O’Brien extolling the virtues of the CBDMD line of products on his Instagram page.   CBD’s proponents cite its purportedly therapeutic effects, ranging from analgesic, anti-inflammation, anti-anxiety, and mild sedation.  Some proponents have even used the term the “boy scout molecule” to describe its positive effects because it always “does the right thing.” 

Although the FDA has only approved CBD in the context of clinical trials for the drug Epidiolex—used to treat a form of epilepsy—the market interest in CBD, derived in part from the anecdotal reports of its benign and benevolent bodily effects, has skyrocketed in the recent past.  In fact, the cannabis industry market research firms BDS Analytics and Arcview Market Research estimate that the CBD industry could reach a value of $20 billion by 2024.  In spite of the overwhelming public interest and market demand, one question remains: is it legal?  In the article below, we answer the fundamental frequently asked questions about the current, hazy legal framework.

FAQ:

IS CBD LEGAL AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL?

IS CBD LEGAL UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW?

CAN YOU PUT CBD IN FOOD OR DRINKS?

CAN I DEPOSIT FUNDS FROM HEMP-DERIVED CBD WITH A BANK? CAN I GET A BANK LOAN FOR MY HEMP-DERIVED CBD BUSINESS?

WHAT’S NEXT?

Is CBD legal at the federal level?

Yes—if it is derived from hemp, not cannabis.  The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (the “Farm Bill”) passed by Congress revised Controlled Substances Act to differentiate between the plants cannabis and hemp.  Without delving too deep into botany and plant genetics, generally speaking, hemp is the same species as cannabis sativa, but has little to no psychoactive properties—that is, a very low proportion of delta-9 tetrahydrocannbinol (THC). 

Indeed, the Farm Bill defines hemp as “the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including the seeds thereof and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannbinol [THC] concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis.”  Because the plant is itself legal, that has paved the way for the nationwide legality of CBD, provided it is derived from a hemp plant. 

That being said, the Farm Bill also provides that hemp-derived CBD, as well as the hemp plants themselves, are subject to relatively strict state-federal oversight, where hemp cultivators, in states like California that have opted to develop a hemp program, must apply for licenses from state departments of agriculture who have submitted an approved plan to the United States Department of Agriculture.  Cultivators in states that have opted not to develop a hemp program must apply to the federal government for licenses to grow. 

The penalty for cultivators that grow a crop that is out of compliance—that is, one that contains more than 0.3% THC—is the harsh remedy of mandatory destruction of the entire crop.  This legal regime has brought into relief the climate sensitivity of hemp, in that seeds grown in one state can generate a crop coming in under the 0.3% threshold, while identical seeds grown in a different state can result in a non-compliant crop subject to destruction.  As the science on the plant develops, hemp cultivators will continue to have to bear the risk of these variations in THC content as long as cannabis and THC remain federally illegal.

Is CBD Legal under California Law?

Yes. Nothing earth shattering here, but a foundational point that puts California at odds with federal law once again.  Now that cannabis has been legalized for recreational use in California, the whole plant, including CBD derived from cannabis, is now legal at the state level (provided the parties in the supply chain have the proper licensure, of course).

However, cannabis is still federally illegal.  CBD derived from cannabis, as opposed to hemp, is still federally illegal, placing CBD in the same legal netherworld as California-legal cannabis and THC.  That is, businesses and individuals that grow, manufacture, process, distribute, sell, and consume cannabis, even in states where it has been legalized for adult-use/recreational purposes, are still breaking federal law, which considers cannabis a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act.

However, there is a measure of protection for medical cannabis operators.  Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163 (2016), the federal government is prohibited from prosecuting individuals or entities for medical cannabis usage or distribution, provided that those same persons are in compliance with applicable state medical cannabis laws.  Id. at 1177.  In that case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that then-entitled Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment (now known as the Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment)—a Congressional rider on appropriations bills that prevents the federal government from using federal funds to prosecute state law-compliant individuals or entities for cannabis usage/possession/distribution in states where medical cannabis is legal—was a binding prohibition on federal drug law prosecution against legal medical cannabis operators and consumers.  The Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment is currently in effect until September 30, 2020, having been renewed via the 2020 Fiscal Year omnibus spending bill on December 20, 2019. 

However, the Amendment provides no protection from prosecution for recreational, as opposed to medical, cannabis.  Although a broader version of the Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment, which would have extended protection to recreational cannabis usage as well as medical cannabis usage, passed the House in June of 2019, the Senate refused to consider that expansion.  On the other hand,  the Cole Memorandum (“Cole Memo”), a now-defunct relic of the Obama administration, did provide some measure of protection for recreational cannabis, wherein the then-U.S. Attorney General James Cole in August 2013 instructed the DOJ to de-prioritize prosecution of cannabis cases, provided that the would-be defendants were in compliance with locally-enforced state law requirements.  Of course, the Cole Memo explicitly stated it did not create any substantive civil rights or reduce the powers of the DOJ to prosecute cannabis cases, but instead provided prosecutorial guidelines.  Although ostensibly geared toward avoiding prosecution of medical cannabis, the Cole Memo itself made no such distinction, referring to “jurisdictions that have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in some form,” and came after the first wave of recreational legalization in 2012 in Colorado and Washington.  Regardless of the erstwhile Cole Memo’s scope, the vehemently anti-cannabis former Trump Administration U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the Cole Memo with a one-page memorandum of his own in 2018. 

Ultimately, the current administration has shown relatively little intention of prosecuting recreational cannabis.  Sessions’ successor, William Barr, is less dogmatic about cannabis and its enforcement, and favors a “federalist” approach where the federal government would cede enforcement power and responsibility to the states.  Barr even went as far to say that he “accept[s]” the Cole Memo, but has yet to reinstate it with a memorandum of his own, preferring to delegate the discretionary authority to individual U.S. Attorneys.   

Until the federal government speaks more concretely, as of now, the only thing protecting legitimate cannabis businesses, even if their only product is non-psychoactive CBD (derived from cannabis, not hemp), are the whims of the local U.S. Attorney.  However, California legitimate cannabis businesses can take some comfort in the fact that two of the four California U.S. Attorneys—Robert Brewer of the Southern District of California and McGregor Scott of the Eastern District of California—have made neutral-to-positive remarks regarding their enforcement priorities and personal attitudes toward cannabis, while the other two have remained sphinxish on the matter. 

Can you put CBD in food or drinks?

Not right now, per the FDA.  The FDA regulates food and drink in interstate commerce, and currently prohibits infusion of CBD into human or animal food or drink, citing the dearth of research on the toxicity of the molecule.  However, this status is subject to change, as researchers within and without the FDA continue to explore the effects of CBD on humans and animals.    

In fact, despite the widespread availability of CBD-infused food and drink products, the FDA has recently begun to assert its authority.  On November 25, 2019, the FDA issued a press release announcing that it had “issued warning letters to 15 companies for illegally selling products containing [CBD] in ways that violate the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act).”  The warning letters cited the 15 companies for various violations of the FD&C Act, including “marketing CBD products to treat diseases or for other therapeutic uses for humans and/or animals” and “marketing CBD products as dietary supplements and adding CBD to human and animal foods.”  In so doing, the FDA noted that “it cannot conclude that CBD is generally recognized as safe . . . among qualified experts for its use in human or animal food.”  The FDA cited back to its prior consumer update, where it pointed out the results of several preliminary studies indicating potential negative effects of CBD, including but not limited to liver damage.  In short, the FDA continues to rely on the absence of reliable science on the effects of CBD in justifying a conservative approach to the legal regime surrounding CBD infused food and drink.  More importantly for operators in the hemp and CBD industries, the FDA has shown that is not afraid to crack down on those who would flout the prohibition on CBD-infused food and drink.  Whether these warning letters lead to prosecution for the 15 businesses or their competitors, however, remains to be seen. 

Can I deposit funds from hemp-derived CBD with a bank? Can I get a bank loan for my hemp-derived CBD business?

Unclear.  The federal government and the banking industry are engaged in an ongoing ping-pong match wherein Congress urges banks to accept hemp money, and the banking industry responds by requesting additional guidance from the federal government. 

The initial volley came in April 2019 where Senators Mitch McConnell and Ron Wyden sent letters to banking regulators urging them to issue guidance so that banks would “feel secure in engaging” with the hemp industry, but also noting that “[l]egal hemp businesses . . . should not [be] discriminated against.”  The American Banking Association sent a follow-up letter to financial regulators in June 2019 similarly urging for issuance of guidance to the banking industry such that they would be empowered to accept money from legal hemp businesses. 

On December 3, 2019, federal banking regulators responded by confirming that they would not require federally insured banks to file suspicious activity reports for hemp business clients.  In so doing, they confirmed that hemp is no longer considered a Schedule I controlled substance, and that hemp business customers are responsible for compliance with the regulatory framework put forth by the Farm Bill.  Despite this reassurance, the ABA responded positively to the announcement, but stopped short of announcing it was open season for hemp business loans, noting that they would work with regulators to “develop additional guidance.”   In short, although federal regulators and the banking industry are closer to reaching consensus on providing financial services to hemp businesses than they were in early 2019, the banking industry has not indicated that they are entirely open for business.  That being said, the rollback of the suspicious activity reports rule perhaps paves the way for more risk-tolerant financial institutions to jump into servicing the hemp industry while the more conservative wing of the industry waits for additional federal guidance and assurances. 

What’s Next?

The legal framework for CBD, much like that of cannabis more broadly, has yet to catch up to the market demand.  Because of the potential pharmaceutical, food, and drink applications of CBD, the FDA has taken the lead on its regulation, holding a public hearing from various stakeholders at the end of May 2019.  The FDA has not yet issued further rules or guidance since then, presumably to digest the numerous comments made at that day-long hearing.  Until then, hemp-derived CBD is safely in the stream of commerce, as long as it is not in food or drink.  Cannabis-derived CBD is in the same legal purgatory as California-legal cannabis, but may benefit from the same amount of prosecutorial discretion.  As far as your favorite CBD lemonade your local liquor store stocks, that product is in jeopardy of being taken off the shelves, as demonstrated by the FDA’s November warning letters.   

https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/cbd-infos-tCZVzr9TvxQ-unsplash-scaled.jpg 1920 2560 Jake Ayres https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GA-Logo-Header-Blue-300x119.png Jake Ayres2019-12-08 23:40:002026-04-08 15:47:55The CBD FAQ

An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Civil Extortion or Demand Letter

August 6, 2019/in All Blog Posts, Corporate Litigation/by Jake Ayres

When sending a demand letter, whether the sender is an attorney or a lay person, it can be tempting to come in guns blazing.  While it is standard practice to threaten civil litigation, sometimes the sender will contemplate other threats, such as threatening criminal prosecution or calling the IRS (or FTB).  However, while it may be only human to try and maximize the leverage present in the demand letter in order to effectuate a result, making threats to report someone in a demand letter can result in liability for civil extortion and place the demand letter outside of the litigation privilege.  This article discusses the often fine and blurry line between a strongly worded demand letter and an extortionate threat.

The Basics

Before exploring the case law, a quick primer on the law defining civil extortion is in order.  Extortion is defined as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent . . . induced by a wrongful use of force or fear . . . .”  Pen. Code § 518.  Fear, for purposes of extortion, “may be induced by a threat of any of the following: 1. To do an unlawful injury to the person or property of the individual threatened or of a third person.  2. To accuse the individual threatened . . . of any crime.  3. To expose, or impute to him . . . any deformity, disgrace, or crime.  4. To expose a secret affecting him . . . .  5. To report his . . . immigration status or suspected immigration status.”  Pen. Code § 519.  Moreover, attempted extortion is just as punishable as successful extortion.  Pen. Code § 523.  

Threats that may be legal on their own can become extortionate “when coupled with a demand for money.”  Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp.  v. Chuidian, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 1079 (1990).  Extortionate threats are criminal regardless of “whether or not the victim committed the crime or indiscretion upon which the threat is based and whether or not the person making the threat could have reported the victim to the authorities or arrested the victim.”  Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal. 4th 299, 327 (2006) (citations omitted).  Moreover, the victim need not be accused of a specific crime—vague intimations suffice, provided that “‘the accusations . . . put the intended victim of the extortion in fear of being accused of some crime.’”  Id. (quoting People v. Sanders, 188 Cal. 744, 749-50 (1922)).

Origin of the Species: Flatley v. Mauro

The seminal case on the issue of civil extortion in California is Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal. 4th 299 (2006).  In that case, Michael Flatley, the “Lord of the Dance” himself, received a demand letter from attorney D. Dean Mauro on behalf of a woman who claimed that Flatley had raped her in a Las Vegas hotel room.  In the demand letter, Mauro threatened that “all pertinent information and documentation, if in violation of an U.S. Federal, Immigration, I.R.S., S.S. Admin., U.S. State, Local, Commonwealth U.K., or International Laws, shall immediately be turned over to any and all appropriate authorities” if Flatley did not immediately settle the case.  Id. at 308-09.  The letter also threatened to send press releases to a laundry list of media outlets if Flatley declined to settle.  Id. at 309.  In subsequent phone calls with Flatley’s attorneys, Mauro said it would take “seven figures” to settle the matter and prevent him from “going public.”  Id. at 311.  

After declining to pay Mauro, Flatley sued Mauro for, among other things, civil extortion.  Id. at 305.  Mauro filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Flatley’s complaint, arguing that his demand letter, upon which Flatley’s complaint was premised, was subject to the litigation privilege.  Id. at 311.  Flatley argued that Mauro’s letter constituted extortion and was therefore illegal conduct unprotected by the litigation privilege.  Id.  The trial court agreed with Flatley and denied Mauro’s anti-SLAPP motion.  Id.  The Court of Appeal affirmed.  Id. 

The California Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal and held that because Mauro’s letter and subsequent phone calls constituted extortion, were illegal as a matter of law, and thus unprotected by the litigation privilege.  Id. at 333.   The court held that Mauro’s threats to accuse Flatley of rape squarely met the definition of extortion in that he “threatened to ‘accuse’ Flatley of, or ‘impute to him,’ ‘crimes’ and ‘disgrace.’”  Id. at 330 (citing Pen. Code § 519).  The court also reasoned that Mauro’s vaguer threats to report Flatley for unspecified violations of immigration and tax law established extortion because they put Flatley in fear of being accused, and were placed even more firmly within the realm of extortion because these alleged violations were unrelated to Mauro’s client’s claim against Flatley.  Id. at 330-31.  

Despite the foregoing, the court did attempt to cabin its holding to the facts of the case:

We emphasize that our conclusion that Mauro’s communications constituted criminal extortion as a matter of law are based on the specific and extreme circumstances of this case. . . . [O]ur opinion should not be read to imply that rude, aggressive, or even belligerent prelitigation negotiations, whether verbal or written, that may include threats to file a lawsuit, report criminal behavior to authorities or publicize allegations of wrongdoing, necessarily constitute extortion. . . . Nor is extortion committed by an employee who threatens to report the illegal conduct.  In short, our discussion of what extortion as a matter of law is limited to the specific facts of this case.  

Id. at 332 n.16 (emphasis added).

Flatley’s Progeny: Trying to Draw the Line

The court’s firm repudiation of Mauro’s aggressive pre-litigation tactics has cast a long shadow over demand letters in later cases, resulting in liability for attorneys.

Although not as over-the-top as Mauro’s demand letter, an attorney’s demand letter in Mendoza v. Hamzeh, 215 Cal. App. 4th 799 (2013) was threatening enough for the Court of Appeal to affirm the trial court’s holding that it was extortionate.  In that letter, attorney Reed Hamzeh told plaintiff Miguel Mendoza, a former employee of Hamzeh’s client, Hamzeh demanded a payment of at least $75,000, or he would “be forced” to report Mendoza to “the California Attorney General, the Los Angeles District Attorney, the Internal Revenue Service regarding tax fraud, the Better Business Bureau, as well as to customers and vendors with whom he may be perpetrating the same fraud upon.”  Id. at 802.  The court held that “Hamzeh’s threat to report criminal conduct to enforcement agencies and to Mendoza’s customers and vendors, coupled with a demand for money, constitutes ‘criminal extortion as a matter of law.’”  Id. at 806.  Importantly, the court also noted that although Hamzeh’s threats were not as egregious as those in Flatley, they still constituted extortion as a matter of law, concluding that “[t]he rule must be a bright line rule.”  Id. at 807.  

The courts further refined the Flatley rule in Stenehjem v. Sareen, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1405 (2014), when the Court of Appeal reconfirmed that veiled threats still can constitute extortion as a matter of law.  Jerome Stenehjem sued his former employer, AKON, and his boss, Surya Sareen, for wrongful termination after he was terminated for misconduct.  Stenehjem sent an email to Sareen’s counsel demanding a settlement payment and vaguely invoking a potential qui tam case based on AKON’s allegedly fraudulent billing practices.  In particular, Stenehjem wrote that he did not want to “involve the United States Attorney General, the Department of Justice or the DOD, nor did he “wish to make a Federal case out of this,” nor was it his “first choice to procede [sic] with the Qui Tam option.”  Id. at 1422.  Despite the more veiled and circumspect threats to report Sareen to the authorities, the court concluded that Stenehjem’s email constituted extortion as a matter of law because “[i]t threatened to expose Sareen to federal authorities for alleged violations of the False Claims Act unless he negotiated a settlement of Stenehjem’s private claims.”  Id. at 1422.  The could reasoned that just because Stenehjem’s threats were “less than explicit” did not render them legal—“that Stenehjem’s threats may have been ‘veiled’ . . .  or ‘half-couched in legalese does not disguise their essential character as extortion.’”  Id. at 1425 (citations omitted).  Finally, the court also noted that the conduct threatened to be exposed by Stenehjem was unrelated to his claim for wrongful termination.  Id. at 1423.  

On the other end of the spectrum, the court in Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283 (2013) determined that a pre-litigation demand letter with no “overt” threat to report the plaintiff to authorities was not extortion as a matter of law and thus survived an anti-SLAPP challenge by virtue of being subject to the litigation privilege.  Plaintiff Michael Malin was accused, in a letter from defendant celebrity lawyer Marty Singer, who was representing Malin’s business partner Shereene Arazm, of misappropriating company funds, including “to arrange sexual liaisons with older men.”  Id. at 1288.  The demand letter, in addition to threatening a civil lawsuit, accused plaintiff of “engag[ing] in insurance scams designed to defraud . . . insurers,” “hid[ing] assets from creditors as well as from the taxing authorities.”  Id.  The court held that the letter did not constitute extortion as a matter of law, and contrasted it with the letters at issue in Flatley and Mendoza, reasoning that “Singer’s demand letter did not expressly threaten to disclose Malin’s alleged wrongdoings to a prosecuting agency or the public at large.”  The court also noted that the “secret” threatened to be exposed was related to Singer’s client’s claims against Malin, unlike the conduct threatened to be exposed in Flatley and Mendoza, which “had no reasonable connection to the underlying dispute.”  Id. at 1299.  

Federal Courts Weigh In

The federal courts have also had opportunities to interpret Flatley and its progeny.  The California Central District Court held that a letter from a composer plaintiff to a music production company defendant threatening to, inter alia, “file a criminal complaint with the FBI [and] seek whatever criminal punishment the justice department might see fit” was extortion as a matter of law.  Baker v. FirstCom Music, No. LACV 16-8931-VAP (JPRx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222010, at *19 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2017).  Reaching the opposite conclusion, the California Central Bankruptcy Court held in King v. McCarthy (In re McCarthy), No. 2:12-bk-40506 ER, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4708 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2013) that a creditor’s threat to “picket [debtor’s] home and [debtor’s and debtor’s] spouse’s respective workplaces, and to obtain media coverage of Plaintiff’s non-payment of the amounts due Debtor” did not constitute extortion as a matter of law.  Id. at *10.

Analysis and Takeaways

Although whether civil extortion exists as a matter of law is a slippery question, certain “dos and don’ts” for demand letters can be extrapolated from the leading cases:

  • Don’t threaten to report the recipient to the authorities.  In Flatley, Mendoza, Stenehjem, and Baker, all of the senders made threats to report the recipients, and all of those communications were held to be extortionate as a matter of law.  However, per Flatley’s footnote, this threat must be coupled with a demand for money to be extortionate.  Flatley, 39 Cal. 4th at 332 n.16.  One still may threaten to report someone to the authorities if not also demanding money.  However, a demand letter is almost always aimed toward monetary recovery.  Therefore, a best practice would be to avoid threats to report the recipient to any and all authorities.
  • Don’t get cute, either.  The sender in Stenehjem did not explicitly condition his reporting the recipient to the authorities on payment of his demand, but instead tried to avoid making a direct threat by saying he did not “want . . . to involve” various federal authorities in his dispute with the recipient.  Recognizing this tactic as a mafia-style “it’d be a real shame if something happened to you”-type threat, the court firmly established that even “veiled” threats can constitute extortion as a matter of law.  Accordingly, when drafting a demand letter, don’t try to veil your threats—a court is likely to see right through such an attempt.
  • If you must bring up other wrongdoing, do draft carefully.  The line between the “cute” but illegal threats of Stenehjem and the more plain, legal statements of wrongdoing in Malin is blurry at best.  The main difference between the two is how delicately they are drafted.  One could argue, as the plaintiff did in Malin, that Singer’s mention of violation of tax laws and insurance fraud constituted an implicit threat to report the plaintiff for those violations.  While the court in Malin reasoned that Singer’s demand letter was allowable because there was no “overt” threat, Stenehjem—decided a year after Malin—confirmed that implicit—or “covert”—threats can also qualify as extortion.  Although it is unclear whether a court would interpret the statements in Malin as “implicit” threats with the benefit of Stenehjem as precedent, it is advisable to err on the side of “just stating the facts” side of the scale and mention knowledge of violations of the law without mentioning the relevant authorities.  
  • If you must bring up other wrongdoing, do make sure it is related to the underlying claims.  Although it is unclear whether “unrelatedness” is a prerequisite to a finding that a threat to report or reveal is extortionate, courts are clear in that they view threats to reveal misconduct that is related to the underlying claim more favorably.  In Flatley and Stenehjem, the courts both explicitly noted that the conduct threatened to be exposed was unrelated to the underlying claims against the recipients of the demand letters, thus weighing in favor of a finding of extortion.  On the other hand, the threat found to be extortionate by the sender in Baker was ostensibly related to his underlying claims for, inter alia, fraud, copyright infringement, and RICO violations.  One could harmonize the seemingly conflicting rulings on relatedness by requiring relatedness for the “secret” prong of Penal Code section 519, and not requiring it for the “crime” prongs of that section.  See Malin, 217 Cal. App. 4th at 1299 (“[T]he ‘secret’ that would allegedly expose [Malin] and others to disgrace was inextricably tied to Arazm’s pending complaint. . . . We cannot conclude that the exposure of Malin’s alleged activities would subject him to any more disgrace than the claim that he was an embezzler.”); see also id. (holding that Singer’s letter was not extortionate because, unlike the letters in Flatley and Mendoza, it did not “contain[] . . . express threats [to report Malin to prosecuting agencies or the IRS] and others that had no reasonable connection to the underlying dispute”) (emphasis added). 

The law on civil extortion is a highly fact-specific world of fine lines.  Because of the nuanced law on the subject, the safest bet is to avoid making threats to report the recipient of the demand letter to any authority for a supposed criminal violation, whether explicit or implicit.  However, as the foregoing cases demonstrate, there is substantial wiggle room, particularly when it comes to the “secret exposure” prong of the penal code.  In any event, it behooves prospective plaintiffs and their counsel to think twice before making threats to report in a demand letter. 

There’s more to learn. Read Part II here:

https://socal.law/an-offer-you-cant-refuse-part-ii-no-cash-no-claim/
https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/brusk-dede-tjd5CfdDPRA-unsplash-scaled.jpg 1707 2560 Jake Ayres https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GA-Logo-Header-Blue-300x119.png Jake Ayres2019-08-06 23:45:002026-04-08 15:49:39An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Civil Extortion or Demand Letter

In the Weeds on the SAFE Banking Act

May 20, 2019/in All Blog Posts, Cannabis, Corporate Litigation/by Jake Ayres

In tax season of 2019, a legal cannabis grower walked a nerve-wracking 20 yards from the parking lot to a California government office to pay his state taxes—with a pile of $350,000 in cash.  The illegality of cannabis at the federal level has largely shut cannabis businesses—legal at the state level—out of traditional banking.  As a result, cannabis businesses operate on an all-cash basis, leading to cash payments to employees, vendors, professional service providers, utilities, and government entities.  While this has been a boon to the armored transport and logistics industries, cannabis businesses striving to remain within the contours of the law find themselves bearing the considerable burdens of operating on an all-cash basis, racking up considerable overhead to protect large sums of cash from would-be thieves.  Given the onus placed on cannabis businesses—and, arguably, neighbors wary of 24/7 armed guards—cannabis business surely cannot remain excluded from banking forever, can they? Enter the Secure And Fair Enforcement (SAFE) Banking Act of 2019

This Act would open the federal floodgates holding back a swollen river of cannabis money, allowing cannabis business to bank their money with traditional financial institutions.  The SAFE Banking Act, cosponsored by a bipartisan group of 180 representatives, has already been approved for a U.S. House of Representatives floor vote after passing the House Financial Services Committee on March 28, 2019, with a 45 to 15 vote.  On April 8, 2019, the House Judiciary Committee referred the bill to the House Committee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, where it has not yet received a vote.  A week later, companion legislation was reintroduced in the Senate.  On May 9, the attorneys general of 33 states (along with Washington D.C. and four U.S. Territories) sent a letter to Congress to advocate for the bill’s passage, arguing that “the reality of the [cannabis industry] requires federal rules that permit a sensible banking regime for legal businesses.” 

The SAFE Banking Act would provide safe harbor for financial institutions to accept money from “cannabis-related legitimate businesses” (“CRLBs”)—that is, cannabis businesses that are in compliance with the applicable state law regime—in that they would be immunized from adverse federal action, whether by federal regulators or prosecutors.  The bill would also immunize funds derived from state-legal cannabis transactions from the federal money laundering statute.  Finally, the bill also would immunize collateral interests held by banks in loans provided to the cannabis industry from asset forfeiture, making possible bank foreclosures on cannabis business assets, such as farms or other real estate.  

The bill also goes beyond CRLBs to provide banking access to “service providers” to the cannabis industry.  The bill’s definition of “service provider” is broadly worded to include any business that “sells goods or services” to a CRLB, and explicitly includes real estate professionals, lawyers, and “other licensed services”—e.g. CPAs.  In particular, the bill would extend the safe harbor and money laundering exemptions to funds deposited by service providers in addition to CRLBs.  In other words, the vendors and professionals providing services to the cannabis industry would also be allowed to bank money derived from their cannabis industry clients with financial institutions.  This would be a financial security blanket for the notoriously risk-averse legal profession, although California lawyers have already obtained a measure of protection with the November 2018 amendment to California Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.2.1, which allows California attorneys to counsel legal California cannabis businesses, provided that they advise said business regarding federal illegality.  

The House Financial Services Committee passed several amendments to the SAFE Banking Act that alter its scope.  Representative Steve Stivers successfully proposed an amendment that explicitly included insurers of CRLBs as a class of businesses to which banks can provide financial services.  Representative Ed Perlmutter also successfully proposed several amendments, the most significant of which broadened the definition of “financial services” in the bill to include armored car services and “money transmitting businesses,” which would presumably open the door to cannabis transactions via PayPal, Venmo, and Western Union.  

Although the SAFE Banking Act’s House floor debate does not yet have a set date, the bipartisan support in the House, along with the support of a majority of the states attorneys general, suggests that it may pass the House.  However, the Senate Banking Committee chair, Senator Mike Crapo, has openly stated his opposition to his committee’s considering the bill.  However, legislative 180s on cannabis are not unheard of, such as former Speaker of the House and cannabis opponent John Boehner’s sudden support for cannabis legalization after joining the board of cannabis company Acreage Holdings.  The SAFE Banking Act would provide relief for a cannabis industry eager to pay its employees and taxes electronically, and would also enervate financial institutions with the munchies for cash from the $16 billion legal U.S. cannabis industry.  Although the legislation remains a possibility rather than a reality, the traction and bipartisan support the bill has received suggests that legalized banking for cannabis industry funds is a question of “when” rather than “if.”  Regardless of its ultimate success, the SAFE Banking Act merits monitoring by the cannabis and financial sectors such that they can be prepared for the coming changes to their respective industries.  In any case, the days of grocery bags full of cash as tax payments seem untenable in the long term.

https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2h-media-1SDw4biQ6us-unsplash-scaled.jpg 2560 1439 Jake Ayres https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GA-Logo-Header-Blue-300x119.png Jake Ayres2019-05-20 23:49:002026-04-08 15:50:21In the Weeds on the SAFE Banking Act

Insolvency and Corporate Responsibilities To Creditors

February 15, 2019/in All Blog Posts, Corporate Litigation/by Ajay Gupta

The moment a corporation becomes insolvent, a lot can change, and fast.  If the officers and directors of the company are unaware of how insolvency can transform the landscape of corporate responsibilities and duties, they run the risk of exposing themselves to liability for the corporation’s debts, even if there was no personal guaranty.  For purposes of this blog article, we look at how insolvency changes (or doesn’t change) the scope of a director’s fiduciary duties to creditors.

The Business Judgment Rule

First, a little background information.  The decisions of a company’s Board are scrutinized under what is known as the business judgment rule (the “BJR”).  The BJR provides broad latitude to the decision makers of a business, and courts will not review (i.e. second guess) directors’ business decisions or hold directors liable for errors or mistakes in judgment, so long as they satisfy the following: 

  1. Disinterested and independent; 
  2. Acting in good faith; and
  3. Reasonably diligent in informing themselves of the facts.  

When a company becomes insolvent the protections of the BJR remain largely intact.  However, the duties owed by the directors of the company become slightly larger.

Fiduciary Responsibilities

It is well established that corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders and must serve in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.  Corporations Code § 309.  Notably, this fiduciary duty is not owed to a corporations’ creditors. 

In California, only upon a company becoming insolvent does any such duty become owed to creditors.  Even with such duty, however, the duty is limited in scope and is not synonymous with the fiduciary duty directors owe to the corporation and its shareholders.  Unlike the fiduciary duty owed to the corporation and its shareholders (above), there is no statutory authority in California establishing that, upon a corporation’s insolvency, or otherwise, directors also owe a duty to the corporation’s creditors.  In fact, under current California law, there is no broad, paramount fiduciary duty of due care or loyalty that directors of an insolvent corporation owe the corporation’s creditors solely because of a state of insolvency.  Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1041. 

Rather, the duty owed by directors to creditors is an extension of the contractual relationship that already exists between the creditor and the company in question, and stems from what is known as the “trust fund doctrine. 

The Trust Fund Doctrine

The trust fund doctrine dictates that all of the assets of a corporation, immediately upon becoming insolvent, become a trust fund for the benefit of all creditors in order to satisfy their claims.  Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1040.  The scope of violations of the trust fund doctrine are limited to instances where directors or officers have “diverted, dissipated, or unduly risked the insolvent corporation’s assets.”  Id.  As such, by relying on the trust fund doctrine, California courts hold that the scope of the duty owed by corporate directors to the insolvent corporation’s creditors is limited in California only to the avoidance of actions that divert, dissipate, or unduly risk corporate assetsthat might otherwise be used to pay creditors claims. This would include acts that involve self-dealing or the preferential treatment of creditors (i.e. directors diverting assets of the corporation for benefit of insiders or preferred creditors). 

Defining Insolvency

With the existence of such a duty owed to creditors upon “insolvency,” the next question, naturally, becomes, “What is the definition of insolvency?”  Unfortunately, there are multiple definitions and, ultimately, will be an issue of fact.  California Corporations Code section 501 provides, for example, that a corporation is insolvent, if, as a result of a prohibited distribution, it would “likely be unable to meet its liabilities … as they mature.”  In the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, a finding of insolvency by the standard of a debtor not paying debts when they become due requires more than merely establishing the existence of a few unpaid debts. See In re Dill, 731 F.2d 629, 632 (9th Cir.1984).  There is also insolvency in the balance sheet sense in which the value of liabilities exceeds the value of assets. See In re Kallmeyer, 242 B.R. 492, 496–497 (9th Cir.BAP1999). 

Fortunately, because the trust-fund doctrine only deals with entities that are actually insolvent, California courts hold that there is no fiduciary duty that is owed to creditors by directors of a corporation solely by virtue of its operating in the “zone” or “vicinity” of insolvency.  Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1041.  While insolvency is a grey area in and of itself (above), the existence of a zone or vicinity of insolvency is even less objectively determinable than actual insolvency, which is further reason why California courts do not prescribe a duty owed to creditors when an entity operates in the “zone of insolvency.”  Accordingly, when a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus for directors does not change: directors must discharge their duty to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of the shareholder owners.

Based on the foregoing, and in conjunction wit the BJR, it follows that in order for a creditor to hold a director liable for operational decisions of the business based on allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, the creditor would need to establish the following: (1) the company was insolvent; (2) the conduct in which the director engaged amounted to self-dealing, preferential treatment of creditors, and diversion, dissipation or undue risk of corporate assets; and (3) directors were not personally disinterested and their acts were not performed in good faith and without following reasonable investigation (i.e. a rebut of the presumption afforded by the BJR).   

The challenge for a director is that the definition of insolvency is not clear under California law, as described above.  As a result, when a corporation approaches a point where it cannot pay its creditors or when a dissolution is reasonably foreseeable, it is important to understand the potential obligations to the corporation’s creditors.  The failure to recognize such obligations will expose you personally for liabilities that were once held exclusively by the corporation.  Such personal liability can come in the form of fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, which also may become non-dischargeable in a bankruptcy under 11 USC 523(a).  As such, at a minimum, you should consult with counsel to make sure your bases are covered. 

https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/steve-johnson-0sPFjdcRhko-unsplash-scaled.jpg 1466 2560 Ajay Gupta https://socal.law/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GA-Logo-Header-Blue-300x119.png Ajay Gupta2019-02-15 23:55:002026-04-08 15:51:18Insolvency and Corporate Responsibilities To Creditors
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